Evidence by Harvey, Joseph B.
Cal Law Trends and Developments




Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw
Part of the Evidence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cal Law Trends and Developments by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joseph B. Harvey, Evidence, 1970 Cal Law (1970), http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/
vol1970/iss1/5
Evidence 
by Joseph B. Harvey* 
I. Introduction 
II. Legislative Developments of 1969 
A. The Informer Privilege 
B. Subpoenas: Business Records, Witnesses 
C. Presumptions: Blood Alcohol 
III. Judicial Developments of 1969 
A. Confrontation and Hearsay: Witness' Prior State-
ment 
B. Hearsay: Former Testimony 
C. Privileges: Self-Incrimination 
D. Privileges: Husband and Wife 
* B.A. 1949, Occidental College. 
LL.B. 1952, University of California, 
Hastings College of the Law. Partner: 
Gross, Mansfield, Harvey, and Miller. 
Member, California State Bar. 1959-
67, Assistant Executive Secretary of the 
California Law Revision Commission, 
CAL LAW 1970 
participating in the Commission's for-
mulation of the California Evidence 
Code. 
The author extends his appreciation 
to Robert E. Edwards, student at Gold-
en Gate College, School of Law, for 




Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
Evidence 
E. Opinion Testimony 
F. Search and Seizure 
G. Writings To Refresh Recollection 
IV. Conclusion 
I. Introduction 
The principal developments and trends to be noted in 
the law of evidence appeared this year in appellate Court 
decisions. The legislative changes were few. Only one legis-
lative change seems likely to be of any significance and will 
be felt primarily by drivers accused of being under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquor. For lawyers, the notable de-
velopments appear in the case law; it is likely that the courts 
will remain the primary arena for the development of the law 
of evidence for some time to come. 
II. Legislative Developments of 1969 
A. The Informer Privilege 
As originally enacted, Evidence Code section 1042 codified 
the rule, previously declared by the courts, requiring a crimi-
nal prosecution to be dismissed if the name of an informer 
who is a material witness on the issue of gUilt is concealed by 
the government under the informer privilege contained in Evi-
dence Code section 1041.1 With the exception hereinafter 
noted, section 1042 also required the Court to suppress evi-
dence, strike the testimony, or make some other appropriate 
order if the government chose to invoke the informer privilege 
to conceal the name of an informant who was a material wit-
ness, not as to guilt, but on some narrower issue such as the 
admissibility of evidence.2 Subdivision (c) of section 1042 
provided an exception in narcotics cases permitting the gov-
ernment to conceal the name of a confidential informant who 
1. Comment to Evid. Code § 1042. 
92 
2. Comment to Evid. Code § 1042. 
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was not a material witness on the issue of guilt, if the court 
was satisfied that the informant was a reliable informant. 
In 1969, the legislature broadened the exception contained 
in subdivision (c) to apply in any criminal prosecution. At 
the same time, subdivision (d) was added to deal with the 
situation where the defendant contends that the confidential 
informant is a material witness on the issue of guilt and the 
prosecution contends that he is not. Subdivision (d) of sec-
tion 1042, as added in 1969, provides that the Court may con-
duct a hearing out of the presence of the defendant and his 
counsel at which the name of the informant can be revealed. 
The purpose of this in camera hearing is to determine whether 
nondisclosure will deprive the defendant of a fair trial. If the 
court determines that nondisclosure will not deprive the de-
fendant of a fair trial, the proceedings in camera remain 
secret. If the court concludes that the defendant would be 
deprived of a fair trial if the name of the witness is not revealed 
to him, the Court then may proceed as authorized in subdivi-
sion (a) to make such order as may be required to assure a 
fair trial to the defendant. 
B. Subpoenas: Business Records, Witnesses 
The 1969 session of the legislature also broadened the 
scope of sections 1560-1566 of the Evidence Code. These 
sections permitted a hospital records custodian, when respond-
ing to a subpoena duces tecum, to send the records with an 
affidavit instead of appearing personally. As revised by the 
legislature, these sections now grant the same privilege to the 
custodian of any business record. The requisite affidavit must 
show that the affiant is the custodian of the record, that the 
forwarded record is that described in the subpoena, and that 
such record was prepared in the ordinary course of business 
at or near the time of the act, condition, or event reported in 
the record. As under the previous version of the statute, the 
personal attendance of the custodian of the record may be re-
quired by a statement on the subpoena duces tecum to that 
effect.s 
3. Evid. Code § 1564. 
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A provision similarly designed to permit response to a sub-
poena with the least amount of inconvenience to the witness 
involved was enacted as Code of Civil Procedure section 
1985.1. Under this section, a witness subpoenaed by a party 
need not appear at the time and place specified in the sub-
poena if he agrees with the party at whose request the sub-
poena was issued to appear at another time or upon such no-
tice as may be specified by their agreement. Under this 
section, failure to appear in accordance with the agreement 
is punishable as a contempt. 
C. Presumptions: Blood Alcohol 
Since the Evidence Code created the prevailing system 
under which some presumptions affect the burden of proof 
and others affect the burden of producing evidence, the legis-
lature has from time to time enacted legislation classifying 
presumptions for the purpose of allocating the burden of proof 
or of producing evidence. Probably the most significant of 
these enactments is that contained in section 23126 of the 
Vehicle Code, which was added in 1969. Under this section 
several presumptions affecting the burden of proof were 
created. In a criminal prosecution arising out of acts alleged 
to have been committed by any person while driving a vehicle 
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, there is now 
a presumption affecting the burden of proof that if the person 
has less than .05 % by weight of alcohol in his blood at the 
time of the test, he was not under the influence of alcohol 
at the time of the alleged offense. If the percentage of blood 
alcohol is .05 % or more, but less than .10%, there is no 
presumption as to the influence of the intoxicating liquor. If 
the person is found to have .10% or more of alcohol in 
his blood, it is presumed that he was under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor. 
The effect of these provisions is to be determined by sec-
tions 600-607 of the Evidence Code, which describe the effect 
of presumptions. Applying the Evidence Code to those pro-
visions of Vehicle Code section 23126 relating to the effect 
of a finding of a blood-alcohol percentage of .10 or less, it 
94 CAL LAW 1970 
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appears that they are without significance. Since, in a prosecu-
tion for drunk driving, the prosecution has the burden of prov-
ing that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor, a statute imposing such burden on the prosecution 
after proof that the defendant had a blood-alcohol percentage 
of .05 or less adds nothing to the burden of proof that was 
already imposed on the prosecution. And since prior to the 
enactment of the statute, there was no presumptive effect to a 
finding of any particular percentage of blood alcohol, it is ob-
vious that the provision that there is no presumptive effect to 
a finding of blood alcohol between .05 and .10 percent does 
not change the law. 
The significant provision of new Vehicle Code section 
23126 is the one that creates a presumption that a person 
was under the influence of intoxicating liquor when it is proved 
that his blood contained .10% or more by weight of alcohol. 
Under this provision, the prosecution need prove on the issue 
of "under the influence" only that the defendant had the req-
uisite blood-alcohol percentage. It will no longer be neces-
sary under the statute to prove the actual influence that the 
alcohol had on his behavior. On proof of the requisite blood-
alcohol percentage, the defendant will be required to show 
that he was not under the influence of alcohol. Since the 
presumption is applicable in criminal actions only, under 
Evidence Code section 607, the defendant's burden of proof 
requires only that the defendant raise a reasonable doubt as 
to whether he was under the influence of alcohol. In sub-
stantive effect, the legislature by enacting Vehicle Code sec-
tion 23126 has provided that it is unlawful to drive with a 
blood-alcohol percentage of .10 percent or more unless the 
defendant can raise a doubt in the mind of the trier of fact as 
to whether such alcohol influenced him in his driving. 
It should be noted that the statute as drafted creates a pre-
sumption as to the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time 
of the alleged offense from proof of blood-alcohol percentage 
at the time of the chemical test. The statute does not require 
that the test be given within a prescribed period of time after 
the alleged offense and it does not require proof that the de-
CAL LAW 1970 95 
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fendant had no access to alcohol between the time of the 
offense and the time of the test. 
These omissions could affect the constitutionality of the 
statute. It has been repeatedly held that a presumption is 
unconstitutional if there is no rational connection between the 
fact proved and the fact presumed.3.5 There is obviously no 
rational connection between a blood-alcohol percentage at 
the time of the chemical test and the influence of alcohol at 
the time of an offense unless the test is given within a few hours 
after the offense and the offender had no opportunity to ingest 
alcohol in the interim. Yet these essential foundational con-
ditions are not required to be shown by the statute in order 
to establish the presumption. The presumption arises from 
the blood alcohol level at the time of the test alone. 
The constitutional question could have been readily avoided 
if the legislature had simply based the presumption on the 
blood alcohol level at the time of the alleged offense. Since 
alcohol disappears from the blood at a constant rate, proof 
of the blood-alcohol percentage at the time of the offense 
could be provided by evidence of the chemical test, the time 
elapsed between the offense and the test, and the absence of 
opportunity to ingest alcohol in the interim. It is, therefore, 
somewhat surprising that the statute was drafted in the form 
it now appears. After all, the element of the crime involved 
is being under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time 
of the offense, not being under the influence at the time of 
submission to a chemical test. 
III. Judicial Developments of 1969 
As in former years, the courts have continued to develop 
rules of evidence based on procedural guarantees of the United 
States Constitution. Again, the bulk of the appellate cases 
dealing with evidence are criminal cases. The most significant 
event in the period of time covered by this report is the dis-
covery by the courts of certain new limitations that the Sixth 
3.5. People v Stevenson 58 Cal. 2d (1962); People v Johnson, 258 Cal. App. 
594, 26 Cal. Rptr. 297, 376 P.2d 297 2d 705, 66 Cal. Rptr. 99 (1968). 
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Amendment requirement of confrontation imposes on the 
admissibility of hearsay evidence. There have been sugges-
tions that the Sixth Amendment now prohibits rational 
development of the hearsay rule and may in fact require re-
evaluation of some exceptions heretofore accepted without 
substantial question. Since this development, along with the 
trend it may foreshadow, is by far the most significant event 
of 1969 so far as the law of evidence is concerned, this report 
first turns to those cases dealing with the constitutional right 
of confrontation, the hearsay rule, and the relationship be-
tween the two. 
A. Confrontation and Hearsay: Witness' Prior State-
ment 
The leading case is People v. Johnson,4 decided in 1968. 
In the Johnson case, the defendant's wife and daughter had 
testified before a grand jury that the defendant had committed 
acts of incest with the daughter. On the basis of this tes-
timony, the defendant was indicted. He pleaded guilty, and 
after serving some two years and 8 months in prison, his plea 
was set aside by order of a federal court for lack of adequate 
representation by counsel. On rearraignment, the defendant 
pleaded not guilty and was tried. At the trial, the wife and 
daughter denied that the incestuous acts had occurred. The 
grand jury testimony was then introduced, and under Evi-
dence Code section 1235, it was received for the truth of 
the matters stated. The California Supreme Court held that 
this use of the prior inconsistent statements was impermissible 
under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guaranteeing the right to confrontation in criminal cases. 
In Johnson, of course, the defendant did confront the wit-
nesses whose statements were introduced against him, and he 
did have the right to cross-examine them before the trier of 
fact concerning the subject matter of their statements. Never-
theless, the Court held that the use of their prior statements 
to prove the matters stated violated the constitutional right of 
4. 68 Cal.2d 646, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599, U.S. 1051, 21 L.Ed.2d 693, 89 S.Ct. 
441 P.2d III (1968), cert. den., 393 679. 
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confrontation. Said the Court, that right requires the right of 
cross-examination at the time the statements are given.5 
In 1969, further ramifications of the Johnson decision have 
developed, but the full potential of that decision has yet to 
be realized. 
In Johnson itself, there was no indication that the state-
ments involved would have been admissible if the declarants 
had been unavailable to testify at the time of the trial. Sub-
sequent cases, however, have indicated that the admissibility 
of the statements in the absence of the declarants is not a 
relevant consideration in determining whether the statements 
can be admitted as substantive evidence. Thus, in People v. 
Green6 the Supreme Court held that the Johnson rule is equally 
applicable to inconsistent statements made at a preliminary 
hearing. Thus, the fact that the defendant confronted the 
declarant and had the right to cross-examine both at the pre-
liminary hearing and at the trial itself was not deemed to be 
an adequate vindication of the right of confrontation. 
Peculiarly, the Courts have continued to hold that former 
testimony is admissible as substantive evidence if the declarant 
is unavailable as a witness at the time of trial. 7 "Peculiarly" 
is used to characterize these holdings because it is apparent 
that the declarant is not subject to cross-examination before 
the trier of fact. Indeed, it is a condition of admissibility 
that the witness be "unavailable." 
Under Green, therefore, a witness' former testimony may 
not be admitted as substantive evidence if the witness is 
available and subject to cross-examination. However, the 
evidence can come in if the witness is unavailable-all in the 
name of protecting the defendants' right to cross-examine. 
In Green, the conviction was reversed because the witness was 
available at trial and subject to cross-examination. Had the 
S. 68 Cal.2d 646, 654-660, 68 Cal. 
Rptr. 599, 604-609,441 P.2d 111, 116-
121, cert. den., 393 U.S. 1051, 21 L. 
Ed.2d 693, 89 S.Ct. 679. 
6. 70 Cal.2d 654, 75 Cal. Rptr. 782, 
451 P.2d 422 (1969); fed appeal pend-
ing. 
98 
7. People v. Peters 276 Cal. App.2d 
-, 80 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1969); People v. 
King 269 Cal. App.2d 40, 74 Cal. Rptr. 
679 (1969). 
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witness been unavailable for cross-examination at trial, the 
preliminary hearing testimony would have supported the con-
viction. 
An attempt to justify this anomalous result appears in 
People v. Vinson. s In Vinson, the Court was also concerned 
with the admissibility of prior testimony. In accordance with 
Green, Vinson holds that prior testimony is not admissible 
as substantive evidence when the witness is present and sub-
ject to cross-examination, even though the prior testimony 
would have been admissible as substantive evidence if the 
witness were unavailable at trial. Said the Court, 
It is one thing to use prior testimony . . . when the 
witness is dead, incompetent or out of the jurisdiction. 
It is an entirely different matter to use such testimony 
as substantive evidence when the witness is in court and 
able to testify before the very forum that is going to pass 
judgment on a defendant who is on trial for his life or 
freedom. In the former situation, the hearsay is rea-
sonably reliable and is presumably presented to the jury 
in good faith since it is the only evidence available. In 
the latter situation, the hearsay is no longer reliable, and 
it is not the only evidence available. 
This is obvious nonsense. Former testimony is former 
testimony. Whether it is reliable or not has nothing to do 
with whether the witness is now available or unavailable. 
That a witness has disappeared obviously does not breathe 
additional credibility into his former testimony. One would 
think that if it is constitutionally permissible to introduce as 
substantive evidence a statement of a person who cannot be 
cross-examined before the trier of fact (as in the case of any 
hearsay exception dependent on unavailability), it ought to 
be equally constitutionally permissible to introduce the same 
statement with the same effect when the declarant is before 
the trier of fact and subject to cross-examination. After 
all, it is the right to cross-examine the witness before the trier 
of fact that we are trying to protect. 
8. 268 Cal. App.2d 672, 74 Cal. 9. 268 Cal. App.2d 672, 677, 74 Cal. 
Rptr. 340 (1969). Rptr. 340, 344. 
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In applying the Johnson rule to hearsay evidence that 
would have been admissible if the declarant were unavailable, 
the courts have failed to discern the basic scheme of the Evi-
dence Code in establishing the "unavailability" condition. If 
one will scan the exceptions to the hearsay rule in the Evidence 
Code, he will discover that the condition of "unavailability" 
appears in various hearsay exceptions where the declaration 
involved is a narrative of past events.10 In most instances, 
however, the statement is made under circumstances assuring 
sufficient trustworthiness that it may be admitted even though 
the declarant is not subject to cross-examination at trial. The 
presence of the declarant at trial does not make his former 
statement less trustworthy, and in fact his presence at trial 
should enhance the ability of the trier of fact to determine 
the truth or falsity of his former statement. Why, then, is the 
"unavailability" condition imposed on hearsay statements that 
we would be willing to receive if there were no confrontation 
at trial? 
In these situations, the condition of "unavailability" ex-
presses a preference for the viva voce narration of the witness 
before the present trier of fact over a previous narration of the , 
same event. The condition of unavailability requires the pro-
ponent of the statement to call the witness if he is available, 
instead of relying on his hearsay narration. This, in sub-
stance, is the significance of the Comment to Evidence Code 
section 1230, explaining the addition of the "unavailability" 
condition to the exception for declarations against interest. 
It was not the intent of the drafters of the code that such 
statements should be inadmissible as substantive evidence 
when the witness is produced. Obviously, a declaration 
against interest is no less trustworthy when the witness is at 
the trial than it is when the witness is not. Former testimony 
is no less trustworthy when the witness is at the trial than it 
was when the witness could not be produced. But in each 
of these cases, the "unavailability" requirement forces the pro-
10. "Unavailability" is a condition 
of admissibility for declarations against 
interest, statements of past mental state 
(but not present), statements concem-
100 
ing the declarant's will, former testi-
mony, statements of pedigree or rela-
tionship, and statements of boundary. 
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ponent to produce the witness, and the former statement is 
then available (with just as much reliability as it otherwise 
had) to present to the trier of fact if the witness in his viva 
voce testimony contradicts his prior statement. 
Professor McCormickll has stated the rationale underlying 
the confrontation rule as follows: 
The production of the prosecution's witnesses at the 
final trial is important to the accused in three ways. First, 
in the light of the common law tradition, it affords an 
opportunity for cross examination. Second, it enables 
the accused to look the prisoner in the eye, which was 
once supposed to, and perhaps does, make a false accusa-
tion more difficult. Third, the judge or jury will see the 
demeanor of the witness on the stand and thus be enabled 
better to weigh his credibility. 
Thus, the requirement of confrontation enables the trier of 
fact to better evaluate the truth of the statements being intro-
duced against the defendant. The rule of confrontation en-
hances the ability of the trier of fact to determine such truth by 
requiring that the declarant appear before the trier of fact and 
there face cross-examination by the defendant. Under excep-
tions to the hearsay rule, we are willing to forgo this protection 
to the accused, and to permit certain statements to be admitted 
against him for the truth of their content, even though the 
accused will have no opportunity to cross-examine the declar-
ant before the trier of fact. Under one of these exceptions 
(former testimony), the accused at least had a right to cross-
examine on a previous occasion, but under most of them 
he gets no opportunity to cross-examine at all. It should 
be obvious that the ability of the trier of fact to evaluate 
the truth or falsity of these statements is enhanced, not 
diminished, by the appearance of the declarant at the trial and 
his cross-examination concerning the subject matter of the 
statements. Since the declarant is before the court, the ac-
cused can look the declarant in the eye, and the trier of fact 
11. McCormick, Evidence, p. 484 
(1954). 
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can see the demeanor of the witness on the stand. Most im-
portant, both parties have an opportunity to examine and 
cross-examine the witness. It seems difficult to believe, there-
fore, that the constitutional right of confrontation, which was 
designed to protect the right of cross-examination, excludes 
statements as substantive evidence when the witness is subject 
to cross-examination, but permits the statements to be used as 
substantive evidence when the witness is not subject to cross-
examination. 
In Johnson and Green, the Supreme Court declared that 
the constitutional right of confrontation requires contem-
poraneous cross-examination, that is, cross-examination at 
the time the statements are made before the trier of fact that 
must determine the truth or falsity of the statements. This is 
a newly declared principle, and at least one court has indicated 
substantial doubt that it is required by the Constitution. In 
People v. Pierce12 the court said: 
The Sixth Amendment right of confrontation assures 
the accused an opportunity to probe the witness' ac-
curacy. At this point the needs of effective prosecution 
parallel and do not collide with the interest protected by 
the Sixth Amendment, for the prosecution too, needs an 
effective forensic scalpel. The question is: On which 
occasion was the witness speaking the truth: when he 
made his prior statement or when he gave his courtroom 
testimony? 
A powerful male family figure frequently appears as 
the accused in intra-family sex cases. The dominance 
by which he imposes his sexual desires on the weaker 
members also permits him to close their mouths. The 
pressure he uses to silence the witnesses against him are 
fear, female sentiment and economic need. After the 
offense breaks out into open crisis he needs time to re-
store his dominance. The family's initial outburst of 
complaint is more likely to be reliable, their later tes-
timony apt to be subverted by time and pressure. The 
12. 269 Cal. App.2d 193, 202-203, 
75 Cal. Rptr. 257, 264 (1969). 
102 CAL LAW 1970 
12
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1970, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/5
Evidence 
turncoat witness is a standard syndrome of family sex 
offenses, one which baffles law officers and prosecutors. 
By rejecting present cross examination as a means of 
forcing the witness to explain his past declarations and 
his present testimony, the Johnson rule enlarges on the 
Sixth Amendment, frustrates the prosecution's ability to 
cope with turncoat witnesses and prevents the jury from 
considering evidence of probative value and probable 
reliability. 
The Pierce assessment of the Johnson-Green rule as an en-
largement of the Sixth Amendment seems accurate. Although 
the California Supreme Court cited a number of United States 
Supreme Court cases holding that a prior right to cross-ex-
amine does not satisfy the defendant's right of confrontation at 
trial, no case was cited (there are none) holding the right 
of confrontation is violated when cross-examination at trial 
is permitted. 
The Pierce opinion also points out that the Johnson-Green 
rule forces the use of limiting instructions that require a jury 
to consider evidence for one purpose and shun it for another. 
As pointed out in Pierce, and as suggested by the Supreme 
Court in People v. Aranda,13 few people really believe that the 
jury can intelligently apply such limiting instructions. 
Of more concern is the question of where the doctrine of 
"contemporaneous cross-examination" will lead. In Green, 
it led to a holding that former testimony cannot be used as 
substantive evidence where the witness testifies at the trial 
and has, thus, been subjected to the defendant's cross-examina-
tion on the statements twice. What, then, of recorded mem-
ory? The recorded memory ~xception is contained in section 
1237 of the Evidence Code. Under this exception, as tradi-
tionally recognized, a trial witness can testify that he correctly 
recorded some event that he does not remember, whereupon the 
authenticated record of his memory is admissible to prove the 
13. 63 Cal.2d 518, 529, 47 Cal. 
Rptr. 353, 359-360, 407 P.2d 265, 271-
272 (1965). 
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truth of its content. Since the memory is typically recorded 
out of court, there is obviously no opportunity to cross-ex-
amine at the time the original statement is made. It is true 
that there is an opportunity to cross-examine at the trial, 
but cross-examination at the trial is not contemporaneous 
with the statement that is being offered. Applied con-
sistently, the Johnson-Green principle of contemporaneous 
cross-examination should require the exclusion of recorded 
memory. Indeed, since the witness does not remember the 
event recorded, cross-examination at the trial is largely fruit-
less. It is at least less efficacious and truth-revealing than 
cross-examination concerning a prior statement where the 
witness remembers the event. In the latter situation, the jury 
can observe the witness' demeanor as he explains his present 
and previous stories and relates what he now declares is the 
truth concerning the event. Where recorded memory is con-
cerned, however, the jury never has an opportunity to observe 
the witness' demeanor as he relates the crucial events because, 
as a condition of admissibility, he does not remember 
them. 
It was argued in People v. Gentryl4 that recorded memory 
is inadmissible under the Johnson rationale. Gentry held, 
however, that a right of confrontation does not prohibit the 
use of recorded memory in a criminal prosecution. The Court 
explained that the Johnson rule is properly limited to impeach-
ing statements. The Court held that the Johnson rule should 
not be applied to consistent statements where the witness now 
vouches for the accuracy of the prior statement. 
Forgetting for the moment that the witness in Johnson 
could be cross-examined concerning the events in question 
(because he remembered them), while the witness in Gentry 
could not be cross-examined concerning the events in question 
(because he did not remember them), the Gentry explanation 
is nevertheless inconsistent with the later ruling of the Supreme 
Court in People v. Washington. l5 There, the California Su-
preme Court held that section 1236 of the Evidence Code 
14. 270 Cal. App.2d 462, 76 Cal. 15. 71 Cal.2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 567, 
Rptr. 336 (1969). 458 P.2d 479 (1969). 
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cannot be applied constitutionally in a criminal case to permit 
a prior consistent statement to be admitted as substantive evi-
dence. 
The only distinction to be perceived between Washington 
and Gentry is that the witness in Washington remembered 
the event in question and was, hence, subject to effective cross-
examination at the trial, while the witness in Gentry did not 
remember the event in question and was not, therefore, subject 
to effective cross-examination. Yet, the decisions so far sug-
gest that the recorded memory exception applied in Gentry is 
constitutional, while the consistent statement exception in 
Washington is unconstitutional because of the lack of con-
temporaneous cross-examination at the time of the making of 
the prior statement. The inconsistency in the rules is obvi-
ous, and it is impossible to predict at the present time where 
the "contemporaneous cross-examination" rule will lead in-
sofar as recorded memory is concerned. 
The exception for coconspirators' statements contained in 
Evidence Code section 1223 may also be in jeopardy under 
the Johnson rule. Since typically the coconspirator's state-
ment (made in the course and scope of the conspiracy) is 
made out of court, it is obvious that there is no opportunity for 
cross-examination at the time the statement is made. More-
over, there is typically no opportunity for "contemporaneous 
cross-examination" at the trial, for the usual coconspirator 
cannot be forced to testify because of his privilege against 
self-incrimination. With no opportunity to cross-examine at 
either the time of the statement or the time of the trial, it may 
be that the Johnson rationale will forbid the use of cocon-
spirators' statements as hearsay evidence in criminal prosecu-
tions. 
Indeed, since all the exceptions for vicarious admissions are 
based on a rationale other than the trustworthiness of the 
statements/6 it may be that no vicarious admissions may be 
used in a criminal prosecution because of the lack of the 
16. See Comment to Evid. Code 
§ 403. 
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opportunity for contemporaneous cross-examination before 
the trier of fact. 
Although the objection that hearsay is not subject to "con-
temporaneous cross-examination" before the ultimate trier 
of fact is applicable to all hearsay exceptions, it seems unlikely 
that the Johnson principle may jeopardize any other hearsay 
exceptions. The remaining hearsay exceptions are based on 
some circumstantial probability of trustworthiness, such as 
the fact that the statements were made without time for reflec-
tion, or business, commercial, or governmental activities have 
been based on the statements, or the statements have been 
relied on as true by parties concerned with them for long pe-
riods of time. 
Vicarious admissions, however, are not admitted on the 
theory that they are trustworthy. The trustworthiness of re-
corded memory rests only in the say-so of a witness at the trial 
who does not remember the event. It is unlikely that former 
testimony is admitted because it is trustworthy. Testimony 
given at a trial between different parties is not admissible 
even though it is as trustworthy as testimony admitted under 
the former testimony exception. Hence, it seems more likely 
that former testimony is admitted under Evidence Code sec-
tion 1291, simply because the defendant has already had a 
chance to cross-examine and, inasmuch as we cannot give him 
cross-examination at the trial because the witness is unavail-
able, the former cross-examination must suffice. Even though 
the former testimony may be unreliable-as, for example, if 
it was obtained from a convicted perjurer or from a witness 
who later contradicted himself-the evidence remains admis-
sible but subject to impeachment under Evidence Code section 
1202. Since the admissibility of vicarious admissions, former 
testimony, and recorded memory is not based on any unique 
trustworthiness to be attributed to the statements, the J ohn-
son rationale could be carried far enough to prohibit the ad-
mission of such statements. 
This writer doubts that the Johnson principle will be carried 
further. Already there are indications in the cases that there 
may be some reconsideration of the strength of the rule. 
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In In re Hill/7 the Court held that it was error to admit the 
confession of a codefendant at the defendant's trial because 
of the lack of opportunity for the defendant to cross-examine 
the codefendant before the trier of fact at the time the confes-
sion was made. To admit the confession would violate the 
defendant's right of confrontation. The defendant's right of 
confrontation was violated, said the Court, even though the 
confessing codefendant took the stand and was subject to 
cross-examination. Nevertheless, the error was held to be 
nonprejudicial because the defendant was able to cross-
examine the confessing codefendant at the trial on the subject 
matter of the confession. The Court stated: 
:> 
The constitutional infirmity created by the lack of cross-
examination of Madorid at the time he made his confes-
sion was thus rendered harmless by petitioners' oppor-
tunity to cross-examine him at trial with respect to his 
testimony consistent with his confession.1s 
A similar result was reached in People v. Washington/9 
where a prior consistent statement was admitted for the truth 
of its content. The Court held that this was an error of con-
stitutional dimension because of the lack of opportunity for 
the defendant to conduct a contemporaneous cross-examina-
tion before the ultimate trier of fact. Nevertheless this error 
was also held to be nonprejudicial because the defendant did 
have the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at the 
trial. Said the Court: 
The prior extrajudicial statements of the witnesses were 
in form and substance substantially identical with the 
in-court testimony of the witnesses at the trial. The jury 
was obviously free to give the in-court testimony full 
substantive use if they believed it and defendant's con-
viction indicates that they did. Since the hearsay state-
ments were identical with the courtroom testimony, the 
17. 71 Cal.2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 537, 19. 71 Cal.2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 567, 
458 P.2d 449 (1969). 458 P.2d 479 (1969). 
18. 71 Cal.2d -, -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 
537, 545, 458 P.2d 449, 457. 
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jury could not have logically believed the former and 
disbelieved the latter. In short, the only value of the 
prior statements lay in the mere repetition of what had 
been said on direct examination. There was thus no 
'reasonable possibility' that the constitu· 
tional error contributed to defendant's conviction.2il 
The significance of these two decisions rests on the fact 
that the findings of "nonprejudice" are based on the same 
reasoning underlying the admissibility of a witness' prior state-
ments under sections 1235, 1236, 1237, and 1238 of the Evi-
dence Code. The real question in every case is whether a de-
fendant is prejudiced by the introduction of an out-of-court 
statement when the witness is present in court and testifies 
in regard to the subject matter of the statement, and the 
defendant has a full opportunity to cross-examine concerning 
the statement. Hill and Washington suggest that the admis-
sion of out-of-court statements under such circumstances is 
nonprejudicial. It is but a small extension of these cases to state 
that the statements are admissible, that is, that adequate at-
trial cross-examination satisfies the constitutional guarantee 
of confrontation. 
Accordingly, it may be that the exception for recorded 
memory and the exceptions for vicarious admissions may be 
saved from the Johnson principle. It is difficult to see, how-
ever, how in logic the exception for recorded memory can re-
main immune from the Johnson rule so long as the Court 
continues to apply it with full vigor to former statements 
of a trial witness who is subject to full cross-examination at 
trial. It is to be hoped that the Court will at least modify 
the rule so that the "unavailability" condition will not operate 
to exclude prior statements by the trial witnesses, a function it 
was not intended to serve, but will rather operate as a sort 
of best evidence rule, compelling the proponent to produce 
testimony instead of hearsay, but leaving him free to introduce 
the prior statement if, despite the testimony, such evidence is 
20. 71 Ca1.2d -, -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 
567, 576, 458 P.2d 479, 488. 
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needed and it meets all other conditions of an exception to the 
hearsay rule. 
B. Hearsay: Former Testimony 
The 1969 cases continue to emphasize that the unavailabil. 
ity of a witness to testify at a trial must be genuine before 
former testimony can be introduced. Thus, in People v. 
Baileyl it was held to be error to admit the preliminary hearing 
testimony of an out-of-state witness when the prosecution 
made no showing of any effort to persuade the witness to re-
turn to California, or of any effort to procure the witness' pres· 
ence by the procedure allowed under the Uniform Act to Se-
cure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in 
Criminal Proceedings.2 
In People v. Tedd3 the preliminary hearing testimony of a 
witness was held to be inadmissible where the prosecution 
showed some effort to find him within the state but such effort 
was so little and so late that the court concluded that it did 
not amount to "reasonable diligence." The investigators had 
failed to follow up on a number of good leads that they had 
discovered while looking for the witness. 
In People v. Billon,4 by resort to the judicial notice doctrine, 
the prosecution sought to avoid the application of the "un-
availability" condition to the admissibility of former tes-
timony. The charge against Billon was possession of a firearm 
by a felon convicted of a prior offense involving the use of a 
firearm. At trial, the prosecutor presented a certified copy of 
the defendant's 1963 conviction of assault with a deadly 
weapon, but produced no evidence whatever to show that this 
offense involved the use of a firearm. To overcome the de-
ficiency in proof, the Attorney General asked the reviewing 
court to take judicial notice of the transcript of the preliminary 
1. 273 Cal. App.2d -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 
107 (1969). 
2. See also People v. Nieto, 268 Cal. 
App.2d 231, 76 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1968), 
holding that Evid. Code § 240, requires 
the prosecution to resort to the Uni-
form Act in order to show reasonable 
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diligence in the use of the court's proc-
ess to obtain the presence of an out-of-
state witness. 
3. 273 Cal. App.2d -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 
368 (1969). 
4. 266 Cal. App.2d 537, 72 Cal. 
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hearing relating to the 1963 conviction. The Court refused 
to do so, stating that to do so would amount to a deprivation 
of the defendant's right to a jury trial. In essence, the prose-
cution was attempting to supply proof of the missing element 
(the use of a firearm) by testimony given at the 1963 pre-
liminary hearing without proving the unavailability of the 
witness. Although the Court did not pinpoint the basis for its 
objection to this procedure, its conclusion was necessary to 
preserve the conditions required by Evidence Code section 
1291, for the admissibility of former testimony. 
C. Privileges: Self-Incrimination 
The year 1969 was a significant year for California motor-
ists. As noted above, the legislature enacted a series of pre-
sumptions relating to blood-alcohol percentages for use in 
prosecutions for driving while under the influence of intoxicat-
ing liquor. The California Supreme Court also contributed a 
significant addition to the law of evidence relating to motorists. 
In Byers v. Justice Coud the Court considered the relation-
ship between the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination and the Vehicle Code sections requiring a mo-
torist involved in an accident to stop and give his name. Byers 
had been involved in an accident, but he had failed to stop 
and identify himself. Accordingly, he was eventually charged 
with hit-and-run driving. Byers contended that he could not 
be prosecuted for failing to stop and identify himself, for his 
privilege against self-incrimination entitled him to refuse to do 
so. The Supreme Court agreed with Byers that a requirement 
that he stop and identify himself, when such information might 
lead to a criminal charge against him, would violate his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Therefore, 
to accommodate the Fifth Amendment and the policies of the 
statutes requiring identification, the Court judicially created 
an immunity for any driver who complies with the Vehicle 
Code sections by stopping and identifying himself. The Court 
said such identification evidence may not be used against 
5. 71 Cal.2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 553, 
458 P.2d 465 (1969). 
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the driver in any subsequent criminal prosecution. Since 
Byers himself could not have anticipated that he would be 
granted an immunity from prosecution if he had stopped, the 
prosecution against Byers was barred. Hereafter, therefore, a 
driver involved in an accident must stop and identify himself, 
but the prosecution must use other sources of information to 
identify the driver if it wishes to charge him with any crime 
arising from the accident. 
In a comprehensive opinion relating to police interrogation, 
the Court in People v. Isbl set forth the distinctions between 
a defendant's rights under Massiah v. United States7 and 
Miranda v. Arizona.s The Court pointed out that Miranda 
permits a custodial interrogation of an accused, without the 
presence of counsel, where proper advice has been given 
the accused concerning his rights, and the accused knowingly 
and intelligently waives his right to be represented by counsel 
and agrees to answer the questions or make a statement. Mas-
siah, however, defines the rights of an accused who has been 
formally arraigned and is represented by counsel, whether 
voluntarily chosen or appointed. Under Massiah, no inter-
rogation designed to elicit incriminating statements can take 
place in the absence of the defendant's counsel. Applying 
this distinction to the facts involved in People v. Isby, the 
Court concluded that the incriminatory statements elicited 
from Isby during interrogation after the appointment of 
counsel were inadmissible. It did not matter that the defend-
ant had been given the Miranda advice and warnings and had 
thereafter consented to the interrogation. Following the ap-
pointment or procurement of counsel, said the Court, any in-
terrogation in the absence of that counsel is constitutionally 
impermissible under the standards set forth in Massiah. 
There continue to be cases involving application of 
Miranda standards and repeated attempts by defense counsel 
to apply those standards to nontestimonial evidence obtained 
6. 267 Cal. App.2d 484, 73 Cal. 8. 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 
Rptr. 294 (1968). S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966). 
7. 377 U.S. 201, 12 L.Ed.2d 246, 84 
S.Ct. 1199 (1964). 
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from the defendant. So far, such efforts have proved fruitless. 
Thus, in People v. Walker,9 the Court held that Miranda 
does not require that a suspect be informed that his refusal to 
submit to a blood test may be used against him. Moreover, 
there is no requirement that the defendant be provided with 
counselor an opportunity to obtain counsel before the ad-
ministration of a blood-alcohol or other sobriety test. 
In Rust v. Department of Motor Vehicles10 it was success-
fully contended that an officer who stopped a motorist suspect-
ed of driving while intoxicated confused the driver with the 
Miranda warning. The Court held that the warning given 
the motorist did not make sufficiently clear that the motorist's 
right to an attorney was a right to have the attorney present 
only during questioning, not during the administration of 
sobriety tests. Since the officer did not qualify his warning to 
the motorist concerning the right to counsel, the Court held 
that the motorist's refusal to submit to a test in the absence of 
counsel was not a violation of the Vehicle Code requirement 
that motorists submit to such tests. Later efforts by motorists 
to claim confusion on the basis of the Miranda warning have 
not proved as successful as the claim made in Rust.n 
In People v. Stroud12 the Court discussed the burden of 
proof that must be met by the prosecution to satisfy a judge as 
to the admissibility of a confession. The Evidence Code is 
silent on the question, and there was no case authority in 
California to guide the Court. The Court concluded that 
the prosecution must establish the conditions for the admis-
sibility of a confession beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial 
judge has a reasonable doubt concerning the admissibility of 
a confession, he should exclude the statement. 
D. Privileges: Husband and Wife 
Under former law, a married person could not testify for or 
against the other spouse without the consent of both. Under 
9. 266 Cal. App.2d 562, 72 Cal. 11. See Lacy v. Orr, 276 Cal. App. 
Rptr. 224 (1968). 2d -, 81 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1969). 
10. 267 Cal. App.2d 545, 73 Cal. 12. 273 Cal. App.2d -, 78 Cal. 
Rptr. 366 (1969). Rptr. 270 (1969). 
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Evidence Code section 970, the privilege is taken away from 
the party-spouse and given to the witness-spouse. The privi-
lege is also restricted to a privilege not to testify against the 
other spouse.I3 In People v. Bradford,14 the Supreme Court 
held that the application of Evidence Code section 970, in a 
trial for a crime committed before the effective date of the 
Evidence Code, was not the application of an ex post facto 
law. 
Bradford is of somewhat transitory significance, for there 
will be few crimes committed before the effective date of the 
Code that come to trial hereafter. A ramification of the shift 
of the privilege that is of more permanent significance was 
pointed out by the Court in People v. Coleman. Ia The pros-
ecuting attorney in Coleman commented on the failure of the 
defendant's wife to testify in his behalf. The defendant as-
serted that this was error, citing People v. Wilkes,I6 which was 
decided before the enactment of the Evidence Code. The Su-
preme Court recognized that, prior to the enactment of the 
Code, it was improper to comment on the failure of the defend-
ant's spouse to testify. 
Because, under former law, the privilege was that of both 
spouses, the party-spouse could not compel the witness-spouse 
to testify for or against him. Under the Evidence Code, 
a spouse has no privilege not to testify for the other spouse. 
Therefore, said the Court: 
Comment on a wife's failure to testify for her defendant-
husband does not. . constitute comment on the 
exercise of a privilege that defendant has . . . or on 
his failure to call a witness that he cannot compel to tes-
tify on his behalf. Since defendant's failure to call his 
wife was a failure to call a material and important wit-
ness, his not doing so could be considered by the jury 
and commented upon by the prosecuting attorney.17 
13. See People v. Bradford 70 Cal. 15. 71 Cal.2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 920, 
2d 333, 74 Cal. Rptr. 726, 450 P2d 46 459 P.2d 248 (1969). 
(1969). 16. 44 Cal.2d 679, 284 P.2d 481 
14. 70 Cal.2d 333, 74 Cal. Rptr. 726, (1955). 
450 P.2d 46. 17. 71 Cal.2d -, -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 
920, 925, 459 P.2d 248, 253 (1969). 
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Thus, under Coleman, a prosecutor may comment on a 
defendant's failure to produce a spouse as a witness whenever 
it appears that the spouse has knowledge of facts material to 
the prosecution. 
E. Opinion Testimony 
Several appellate decisions during 1969 involved the pro-
priety of, and limitations on, opinion expert testimony. In 
People v. Zismer,18 the Court held that a footprint cannot be 
introduced in evidence without opinion testimony connect-
ing the footprint with the foot of the defendant. There must 
be some foundational opinion evidence pointing out the simi-
larity in the prints. The Court rejected the suggestion that 
the jury can evaluate the alleged similarity of prints for itself. 
In State of California ex rei. Department of Public Works 
v. Wherity,19 the Court held that it was error for the trial 
court, in a condemnation proceeding, to exclude the tes-
timony of an expert as to the highest and best use of the prop-
erty in question. The expert was offered for the purpose 
of testifying on highest and best use only, not the value of 
the property. 
In People v. King,20 the Court rejected an expert's opinion 
identifying the defendant by a voiceprint. The Court held 
that voiceprint identification is not sufficiently developed 
to permit opinions based thereon to be admitted in court. 
F. Search and Seizure 
The major development in the law of search and seizure 
during 1969 was the rule announced by the United States 
Supreme Court in Chimel v. California.1 Chimel was arrested 
in his home pursuant to a warrant. After serving the warrant, 
the officers asked for permission to look around, and when 
Chimel objected he was advised that on the basis of the arrest 
the officers would conduct the search anyway. The officers 
18. 275 Cal. App.2d -, 80 Cal. 20. 266 Cal. App.2d 437, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 184 (1969). Rptr. 478 (1968). 
19. 275 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. 1. 395 U.S. 752, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 89 
Rptr. 591 (1969). S.Ct. 2034 (1969). 
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searched the house for about an hour and seized certain evi-
dence that was later used against Chimel in a burglary pros-
ecution. The United States Supreme Court held that a search 
incident to a valid arrest must be limited to a search of the 
person arrested. The purpose of the search must be to remove 
any weapons that might be used to resist arrest or effect an es-
cape, and must be limited to the area into which the arrestee 
might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items. 
The search, therefore, must be confined to the arrestee's per-
son and the area within his immediate control. If the search 
is to go further, the officers must obtain a search warrant. 
The arrest itself will not justify a search of the entire residence 
in which the arrest is made. 
G. Writings To Refresh Recollection 
Evidence Code section 771, provides that if a witness uses 
a writing to refresh his memory with respect to any matter 
about which he testifies, the writing must be produced at the 
request of an adverse party and, unless the writing is so pro-
duced, the testimony of the witness shall be stricken. Under 
this section, it does not matter whether the refreshing of the 
recollection was done at the hearing or prior thereto. Under 
subdivision (c) of section 771, production of the writing is 
excused if the writing is not in the possession or control of the 
witness or the party who produced his testimony and was not 
reasonably procurable by such party. 
In Kerns Construction Co. v. Superior Courf the deposi-
tion of an employee of a party was taken by an adverse party. 
During the taking of the deposition, the employee refreshed 
his recollection by referring to reports that he had prepared 
in connection with his investigation of the accident that gave 
rise to the lawsuit. The party taking the deposition demanded 
the production of the reports. The employer from whom 
they were demanded asserted that the reports were privileged. 
The Court overruled this contention and held that the party 
taking the deposition was entitled to compel production of the 
2. 266 Cal. App.2d 405, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 74 (1968). 
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reports. The Court held that the reports were privileged 
under the attorney-client privilege, but when the employer 
furnished the reports to the employee for the purpose of 
refreshing his recollection, the privilege was waived. Al-
though the adverse party took the deposition and thus com-
pelled the employee to testify, the employer was under no 
obligation to provide the reports to the employee for purposes 
of his testimony. Having done so voluntarily, it waived its 
privilege and the adverse party could compel production of the 
reports used to refresh recollection. 
IV. Conclusion 
The movement for evidence reform that resulted in the en-
actment of the Evidence Code began because there was almost 
uniform dissatisfaction with the state of the existing law. So 
far as hearsay is concerned, conditions of admissibility varied 
from exception to exception without apparent reason. The 
scope of various privileges and the conditions of waiver varied 
with a similar lack of apparent reason.3 Accordingly, the 
Law Revision Commission sought to identify the policies un-
derlying the various evidentiary rules and then to apply those 
policies consistently to similar situations in order to avoid 
the anomalies and inconsistencies that existed under prior 
law. As the cases come before the reviewing courts, the 
anomalies and inconsistencies have again begun to appear. 
Indeed, as the California Supreme Court has started to imbed 
the former limitations of· the hearsay rule into the Constitu-
tion, it has begun to make statements lauding the hearsay ex-
ceptions that the Commission and the prior commentators had 
found so inconsistent and unsatisfactory. 4 Thus, for some 
forms of hearsay (any hearsay admissible on a showing of 
unavailability), we find that to guarantee the right of cross-
3. See generally, 7 California Law 
Revision Commission, Reports, Rec-
ommendations and Studies, pp. 29-37. 
4. See People v. Washington, 71 Cal. 
2d -, -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 567, 574-575, 
458 P.2d 479, 486-487 (1969): 
"The use as substantive evidence 
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of prior consistent statements is 
not one of the traditional hearsay 
exceptions developed over a long 
period of time and given recogni-
tion in countless decisions of Eng-
lish and American courts." 
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examination, the courts exclude the evidence when, at trial, 
cross-examination is provided and admit the evidence when it 
is not provided. It is hoped that this development noted in the 
cases this past year is not in fact a trend. It is also hoped 
that the Court will not consider evidence rules constitutionally 
sanctified merely because they are old. Too much reverence 
for the evidence rules developed "over a long period of time 
in countless decisions of English and American courts"5 would 
merely stifle the reforms found to be so necessary. 
s. People v. Washington, 71 Cal.2d 
-, -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 567, 574-575, 458 
P.2d 479, 486-487 (1969). 
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